


# Renewable Energy Auctions: A Guide to Design



## Number of countries with renewable energy policies, by type



Moved from a feed-in tariff to auctions



Moved from auctions to a feed-in tariff




Implemented auctions and a feed-in tariff simultaneously



# Renewable Energy Auctions

*Auctions have increasingly been adopted to support renewable energy deployment*


Number of countries that have adopted  
Renewable Energy Auctions



*Based on REN21 Global Status Report (2005 to 2015)*



2013




2014



2015



# *Strengths and weaknesses of Auctions*



# Renewable Energy Auctions

## Recent highlights

Spain awarded 500 MW of wind and 200 MW of biomass with no financial incentive

Morocco achieved a new low for wind with average bids of USD 30/MWh for 850 MW (the lowest at around USD 25/MWh)

### Germany third round of solar PV

204 MW at 0.08 EUR/kWh (0.0849 EUR/kWh for the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 0.0917 EUR/kWh for the 1<sup>st</sup> with a cap of 150 MW)  
Among the winners 3 individual investors, 2 registered cooperatives and 3 small privately held businesses


Japan announces move to auction from FIT in 2017 to cap installations and reduce costs on consumers

Brazil mandates projects to secure guaranteed grid access prior to bidding

Peru 4<sup>th</sup> auction:  
162 MW of wind at USD 37.49/MWh  
184.5 MW of PV at USD 48.39/MWh  
(USD 220/MWh in 2009 and USD 110/MWh in 2010)

Dubai 800MW solar PV at USD 29.9/MWh

South Africa announces 5<sup>th</sup> auction to target 1.6 GW of new capacity



# *Auction design elements*



# *Key considerations in designing and implementing auctions*

## Increasing competition for cost-efficiency

- Increased participation of bidders
- Prevention of collusion and price manipulation

## Limiting participation to bidders who can meet goals

- Project delivery
- Deployment goals

## Ensuring global and local socio-economic goals

- Qualification requirements
- Multi-criteria selection



# *Increasing competition for cost-efficiency*

## Diversity of technology



- Implementing a technology-neutral auction can enable the development of least-cost technologies



- Implementing a technology-specific auction can fulfil deployment goals

## Volume auctioned





- Auctioning a large volume at once allows for rapid capacity addition but might result in lack of competition




# *Increasing competition for cost-efficiency (cont'd)*

## Level of participation of bidders

- 
- Reducing entry barriers:
    - Requirements and compliance rules commensurate with market conditions
    - Resource assessments, feasibility studies and permits provided to bidders
    - Streamlined administrative procedure and one-stop-shop
    - Fair and transparent rules

- 
- Reducing the perception of risk
    - Demand-side responsibilities
    - Increased certainty and regularity of auction rounds
    - Mitigated financial risk

## Prevention of collusion and price manipulation

- 
- Selecting an appropriate bidding procedure may prevent collusion
  - Introducing a ceiling price can limit the price

# *Limiting participation to bidders who can deliver the project*

## Reputation requirements



- Proof that bidders have the financial, technical and legal capability to develop the project to prevent speculative bidding



- Proof that bidders have the past experience and proven track record to help ensure successful delivery

## Compliance rules



- Bid bonds and project completion bonds to help ensure successful and timely delivery



- Penalties for delay and underbuilding to help ensure successful and timely delivery



- Penalties for under (or over) performance to help prevent under (or over) producing

# *Limiting participation to bidders who can meet deployment goals*

## Technological requirements



- Technologies that can compete to align with national energy policy
- Equipment specifications to ensure quality

## Project size requirements



- Minimum size to enable economies of scale and reduce transaction costs
- Maximum size to encourage small and/or new players

## Location constraints



- Achieve geographic diversification and avoid competition with other sectors
- Ensure proximity to the grid

## Grid access requirements





- Ensure feasibility of integrating renewable electricity into the grid
- Avoid delays due to grid expansion

# Ensuring global and local goals

## Socio-economic impacts

- Qualification requirements
- Multi criteria selection



## Conclusion

### *While designing auctions, policy makers may want to consider the following recommendations:*

- Account for the trade-offs between different design elements
- Different policy options to support deployment are not mutually exclusive.
- Tailor the design of auctions to the specific context





# IRENA

International Renewable Energy Agency

**Thank you!**